Poetry, Science, and the Epistemological Debate by Picchione, John
Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de l'Université de Montréal, l'Université Laval et l'Université du Québec à
Montréal. Il a pour mission la promotion et la valorisation de la recherche. Érudit offre des services d'édition numérique de documents
scientifiques depuis 1998.
Pour communiquer avec les responsables d'Érudit : info@erudit.org 
Article
 
"Poetry, Science, and the Epistemological Debate"
 
John Picchione








Note : les règles d'écriture des références bibliographiques peuvent varier selon les différents domaines du savoir.
Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique
d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter à l'URI https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/
Document téléchargé le 12 février 2017 03:25
Poetry, Science, and the 
Epistemológica! Debate 
John Picchione 
The last few decades have witnessed a radical questioning of the 
epistemological functions traditionally associated with science. In fact, 
the dominant trait of a number of intellectual groups is represented by 
their attempt to devaluate, on a theoretical level, the cognitive 
possibilities of any scientific inquiry. It should be stressed, however, 
that the attack on science launched particularly by the philosophy of 
post-structuralism and deconstruction already had an established 
legacy. Its general orientation can be easily traced back to Nietzsche's 
antifoundationalist philosophy and to Heidegger hermeneutics1. The 
works by Derrida, Lyotard, Foucault, Vattimo, Baudrillard and others, 
which can be classified under the broad label of post-modern thought, 
have essentially only pushed forward the assault on the citadel of 
science2. In their substance, most of the strategies are not entirely new. 
1
 Presenting a radical critique of any concept of truth, Nietzsche's works reduce 
science to a subjective construction (see in particular The Gay Science). For 
Heidegger's hermeneutics there is no understanding, including that associated 
with science, without prejudice. 
2
 It is not possible to discuss here the specific position of each theorist; it will 
suffice to say that they all contribute to a questioning of scientific knowledge 
by advocating a sceptical and relativistic perspective which privileges the 
multiple, the heterogeneous, and the indeterminate. In this general 
philosophical trend, knowledge is either tied to shifting centres of power or 
becomes a fabrication of linguistic illusions ungrounded in any reality (the real 
can actually vanish, giving rise to a world of simulacra in which there are no 
certainties or facts of any sort). See Derrida, L'écriture et la différence', 
Lyotard, La condition postmoderne; Foucault, L'archéologie du savoir; 
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(It should be noted that fundamental epistemological issues were raised 
within the scientific community as far back as the 1920s, specifically 
by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle and by the theories of subatomic 
physics in general3). 
Nonetheless, the post-modernists have undoubtedly 
strengthened the view of science as a manipulation of reality as 
opposed to a cognitive activity. Objectivity and truth, historically 
regarded as irrefutable tenets of science and as its well-defined 
demarcations from the arts or from other human undertakings, have 
been fiercely targeted. In this perspective, scientific knowledge is no 
longer seen as being grounded in empirical investigations guided by 
logical, unbiased, and metahistorical observations. On the contrary, it is 
conceived as a result of temporal paradigms which are inevitably 
entangled in a web of cultural and epochal limitations. Accordingly, it 
is the theories engendered by our paradigms which create scientific 
facts and not vice-versa. That is to say, it is impossible to observe facts 
independent from the theories which produce them. Essentially, the 
claim is that a metatheory capable of indisputable verifications and 
validations does not exist. Science is an expression of ideology, heavily 
compromised by social and psychological factors, or by political 
Baudrillard, Simulacres et simulation', Vattimo, La società trasparente. Here, 
for example, is a statement by Vattimo : "scientific rationality which for 
centuries has represented a guiding value for European culture is, ultimately, a 
myth, a shared belief on which the organization of this culture is based." 
(Vattimo, 1989, pp. 50-51) 
3
 It should be added that thinkers working within the context of the philosophy 
and history of science had considerably undermined epistemological absolutes 
long before it became fashionable in literary circles. Poppers falsification 
theory (The Logic of Scientific Discovery) and Kuhn's relativism (The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions) are, although rather distant in their 
conclusions, the most obvious examples. Kuhn's concept of scientific 
paradigms is a clear anticipation of the post-modernist notion of 
"metanarratives"; both deny any possible claim to universal truths and 
objectivity. Feyerabend's anarchist epistemology (Against Method) can also be 
placed within this theoretical orientation. His basic argument is that science 
projects as biased a world-view as any other discourse and consequently it does 
not possess a method to discover any truth — there are no epistemological 
claims that can never be violated. 
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interests. Science too can be placed, at a superstructural level, not only 
within the ideological expressions of class and gender, but within the 
parameters of the institutions which regulate its research and projects. 
The principal arguments against the validity of scientific 
claims can be summarised as follows : 
1. there is no accessibility to raw reality inasmuch as it will always be 
mediated by pre-given linguistic and mental structures; 
2. cognitive results are inseparable from the specific method adopted 
and from the dialectic subject-object; it is the observer who determines 
the way an object is perceived, thus making it impossible to provide 
knowledge of the object in itself; 
3. there exists an epistemic impossibility to ground any proposition, 
scientific or otherwise; no verification of any truth claim can be 
considered authentic and legitimate; 
4. science is not autonomous with respect to dominant ideologies and 
institutional structures; it is dependent on social legitimation and social 
power; 
5. scientific knowledge — as for instance maintained by Kuhn — is 
erroneously believed to be cumulative; instead, it is regulated by 
transient paradigms which are inevitably displaced by new scientific 
revolutions; 
6. science started out as a project aiming at uncovering the mythologies 
of the world and it has turned itself into a myth; 
7. science, as any other discourse, is a language game with no 
foundation inasmuch as it cannot be grounded in any reality or 
knowledge. 
Greatly influenced by the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein, 
this last postulate is embodied in particular by the works of Lyotard. 
According to the French philosopher, the historic conflict between 
scientific knowledge and narrative knowledge — that is knowledge 
derived from myths, legends and tales — is deceptive. Science too 
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must adopt, as a language game, narrative language in order to provide 
legitimation of its own knowledge«. 
It would be erroneous to conclude that the epistemological 
debate, which is here briefly outlined, is weighted in favour of the arts 
or of literature and poetry in particular. Basically, deconstructive and 
post-modern theories, with their claims of a language without referents, 
subvert all principles of knowledge and try to destroy the humanistic 
view of a subject guiding the process of signification. In fact, as 
language-centred theories, they announce the absence of the author in 
the act of writing and portray all forms of verbal communication as 
being trapped in a labyrinth of tropes with no access to reality. Science 
is in essence reduced to textualism, to a literary genre with no escape 
from the discursive (See Rorty, 1980, in particular p. 141). Guided by 
intralinguistic and intertextual views, these positions announce the 
catastrophe of human cognition inasmuch as they assume that the 
nature of language is fictitious, and verbal signs inevitably dissolve in a 
semantic vacuum which makes it impossible to attach a signifier to any 
signified. 
Such claims represent a form of nihilistic philosophy and 
absolute scepticism which reveal the cyclical return of irrational 
thought. In the prison-house of language, they mistake epistemology 
with ontology and they are forced to negate in the most radical fashion 
the existence of a reality independent from our representations. 
Advocates of these principles are left stranded in a serious 
philosophical contradiction, in a sort of aporia of the sceptic : on the 
one hand, they negate the possibility of truth and, on the other, they 
affirm to know something, thus having knowledge of the truth. They 
declare their total disenchantment with so-called metaphysical or 
ideological thought, but they base their entire philosophical orientation 
on a metaphysical axiom — the claim that reality is unknowable. 
These theories generated a number of false assumptions in 
literary circles, stirring up confusion and causing various damaging 
effects. Moved by the urge to jump on the band-wagon of the latest 
4
 Lyotard (La condition postmoderne) rejects any possibility of transcendence 
and reduces science to a language game which requires the same narrative 
knowledge that it discredits for its own legitimation. 
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philosophical doctrines, many have concluded that everything is just 
rhetoric; scientific knowledge, truth, and evidence are myths; the 
linguistic code is a self-referential system of signs; there is no real 
outside of our representations, and the world is constituted by an 
infinite series of empty simulacra. This, in turn, has caused a 
devaluation of the connections between literature and reality, 
depoliticizing the literary activity and exposing it to a form of 
bourgeois liberalism — a babelic and narcissistic consumption of 
language games without an ethos and without the possibility to propose 
alternative world-views. In a human and natural world dominated by 
arbitrariness, discontinuity, randomness and chaos, it would seem that 
there is no room for any cognitive mapping either in the context of 
scientific inquiry or in the context of literary projects. 
Few would oppose the position that absolute understanding of 
nature probably lies beyond the limits of our knowledge and that a 
value-free inquiry in the realm of the noumenon may be doomed to 
failure. Nevertheless, in defence of scientific undertakings, it is 
possible to maintain that — until proven otherwise — science shows, 
through its iterability of results, the ability to predict physical 
phenomena and to achieve knowledge by successive approximations. 
Science draws empiric maps which assist us to understand and master 
the physical world, making more familiar the space in which we are 
destined to live. Science constantly clears the world of mythologies and 
expands its frontiers but, at the same time, it is incapable of creating 
subjectivity, mental and emotive cartographies. This is the realm 
which, arguably, more than any other human activity, belongs to 
poetry. 
The exploration of this perspective entails a number of 
questions which can be framed as follows : is it possible to speak of 
literary knowledge or poetic cognition in particular? What is its 
specificity? What are some of the fundamental constituents and 
processes intrinsic to poetic creation? Do they really differ from those 
adopted by ordinary language? Do they represent a deviation from the 
norm? 
Giambattista Vico, a thinker who addressed some of these 
problems, answered that poetic knowledge pertains to the domain of 
the senses which he identifies with the primitive age of humanity. For 
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the Italian philosopher, poetic cognition precedes knowledge derived 
by the intellect and it constitutes its foundation inasmuch as "Nihil est 
in intellectu quin prius fuerit in sensu" (Vico, 1968, p. 110). Rejecting 
both classical and Renaissance literary theories, Vico argues that poetic 
tropes are not simple ornaments or disguises of rational concepts. The 
tropological, as a manifestation of sapienza poética, is the first 
expression of human culture and consciousness (indeed, the human 
world owes its formation to the tropological) from which all forms of 
abstract thought are derived. Poetry is the embodiment of the language 
of myth : the fantasy and the feelings of the primitive mind projected in 
the form of images capable of capturing human "universals". Vico 
writes : 
All the first tropes are corollaries of [...] poetic logic. The 
most luminous and therefore the most necessary and 
frequent is metaphor [...] every metaphor so formed is a 
fable in brief [...] by a necessity of human nature, poetic 
style arose before prose style; just as, by the same 
necessity, the fables or imaginative universals, arose before 
the rational or philosophic universals, which were formed 
through the medium of prose speech. (Vico, 1968, p. 129, 
p. 154) 
The association of poetry with a tool for getting to know the 
world through fantasy, imagination, and feelings has cut across many 
ages and poetic theories. Nevertheless, it was Romanticism that 
announced that the poetic experience represents a form of 
consciousness actually much higher than scientific knowledge. The 
great Italian Romantic poet, Giacomo Leopardi, set out to clarify that 
the function of poetry is not representational but creative. "To consider 
and define poetry as an art of imitation," he writes in his Zibaldone, "is 
a very false idea [...] The poet imagines : the imagination sees the 
world as it is not, it forges a world which is not [...] creator, inventor, 
not an imitator : this is the essential character of the poet." (Leopardi, 
1983, pp. 1174-1175) 
The issue of poetic cognition is in fact often distorted by the 
mimetic tradition — mimesis seen as the principle which constitutes 
the core of any poetic expression. Poetry, as well as literature and art in 
general, is perceived solely as a vehicle of representation, a medium 
aimed at depicting a pre-given reality and thus functioning as its 
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mirror. It is considered an artistic attempt to capture external reality or 
to translate, in a special and more intense language, feelings and ideas 
experienced before the act of writing. For representational systems, 
reality and experience are conceived outside of language and precede 
signification, a tradition grounded in Platonic thought. The Greek 
philosopher envisages poetry as an imitation of the sensible — i.e. 
perceptible by the senses — universe and since the latter is itself an 
imitation of the world of Ideas, it follows that poetry is an imitation of 
an imitation, a copy of a copy, a shadow of a shadow, a lie which 
diverts the soul from the eternal and universal essence. Not surprisingly 
the poets are banished from the ideal Republic. 
It can be argued that poetry, like all other forms of artistic 
expression, can never be completely disentangled from principles of 
mimesis since absolute autonomy or unequivocal self-referentiality are 
not only very disputable — no matter how alluring the intralinguistic 
theories of deconstruction may appear in some literary circles — but 
catastrophic at the same time. On the other hand, if the traditional 
canon of mimesis is maintained, poetry becomes a tautological form of 
knowledge inasmuch as it captures what is already there or knowable 
through another medium. A parallel issue arises if poetic cognition is 
compared to the discourses produced in a philosophical, political, or 
sociological context. To think of poetry as a reproduction, albeit in a 
different form, of these discourses would make it a redundant or, at 
best, an ancillary activity. The autonomy of poetry vis-à-vis philosophy 
is central to this problematic. 
The opposition of the mimetic tradition by the principle of 
self-reflexivity constitutes another dead-end for poetry's cognitive 
possibilities. As a form of pure signs without referents, a narcissistic 
mirror of itself, poetry would inevitably cut itself off from any outside 
reality : empty, fictitious signs in love with themselves and without a 
world. Opposed to this view there is the claim that all artistic structures, 
including poetry, should invariably be seen as epistemological 
metaphors. All forms created through art are metaphoric equivalents of 
an "assimilated cultural persuasion" as Umberto Eco maintains (Eco, 
1962, p. 151). However, the fundamental issue here is whether the 
poetic world pre-exists the creative process or whether poetic language 
performs a specific role in the formation both of the self and of human 
realities in general. 
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In order to explore some alternatives to representational 
theories, it is necessary to turn to a radically divergent tradition, one 
that is unquestionably epitomized by the avant-garde and experimental 
practices. Arguably, starting with Mallarmé, these practices moved 
away from a theory of reflection and advocated a conception of poetry 
as an activity centered around the materiality of language and the 
rupture of the linguistic norm. Poetry becomes a disruptive force that 
puts in motion new cognitive dimensions. As an exploration of the 
infinite potentialities of language, poetry champions the primacy of the 
signifier and pushes the linguistic code to limits that no other human 
activity can equal. In this approach, reality is not immediately 
accessible to consciousness. The latter is the result of the unavoidable 
mediation by the signifiers. Thus poetry becomes the great 
intermediary between language and reality — not in the sense that it 
reproduces it, but in the sense that it is able to bring to consciousness 
aspects of reality which were otherwise not immediately accessible. 
As a transgressive energèia, poetry breaks the boundaries of 
our ordinary communication and in so doing broaches alternative 
models of knowing the world and interacting with it. In this case, it is 
the poetic language that produces centrifugal effects and not the other 
way around. Indisputably, poetry is an heteronomous activity inasmuch 
as it is the result of an encounter with extratextual realities. However, it 
is first and foremost the product of a dynamics put in motion by the 
internal movements of the poetic text. Some have argued, as for 
instance Stanley Fish, that there is no difference between ordinary and 
poetic language since formal and rhetorical devices are present in 
both5. But, is it possible to maintain that phonic, syntactic, rhythmic, 
and even visual elements which in poetry are a constitutive part of the 
cognitive processes, play the same role in everyday language? The 
activity of translation represents an indirect proof of their differences. 
The loss of the original signification is much greater in translating a 
poetic text than an ordinary one. Furthermore, the translation of a 
highly experimental text can be essentially impossible; the result is 
often the creation of a different text which shares with the origmal a 
drastically reduced number of elements. 
5
 See in particular the chapter titled "How Ordinary Is Ordinary Language", in 
Is There a Text in This Class? 
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Undoubtedly, poetry is an epochal form inasmuch as it 
interacts with an intricate web of discourses, but it is not an exercise 
which transforms into its own language pre-constituted and ready-made 
messages derived from the work conducted in other fields and 
disciplines. Poetry engenders processes that build and create realities. It 
is the technè which, by stretching the verbal signs to their extreme 
limits, paves the way to expanding consciousness, cognition, and 
imagination. Indeed, it represents a particular cognitive process. 
However, this raises a number of thorny questions. What is 
the relationship between the materiality of the poetic language and the 
subject? Is signification subjectless, the result of a disseminating play 
engendered by the signifiers, as maintained by deconstruction? The 
claim here is that poetry is not a monologic activity expressed either by 
a separate, autonomous subject, a predetermined entity of sensitivity 
and consciousness, or by an independent linguistic code. It is a dialogic 
process which is the result of an encounter between the desire of the 
subject, of a cognizing agent, and the intrinsic itineraries of meaning 
offered by language. The objective is not that of anchoring conquered 
states of consciousness to the written words, but to discover new 
openings of consciousness through writing as an alternative to that 
production of consciousness that we all engage into some degree or 
other by living our everyday lives. Subjectivity renews itself in the act 
of writing; it is a dynamic process. It is the effect of a dialectic, a 
dialectic between a subjectivity in motion and the flux of meanings 
inherent to language. Poetry, then, is a process of identification of the 
subject, the space where new modalities of subjectivity are formed. The 
poet is a nomad, a subject-in-process, constantly searching for new 
states of awareness through language. 
Within this tradition, centered around the historical avant-
gardes (Italian and Russian Futurism, Dadaism, Surrealism) and the 
new avant-garde movements of the 1960s (in particular the Italian 
group / Novissimi and the French poets of Tel Quel), poetry becomes 
the locus of otherness, an anarchic linguistic construct which can 
resemble pathological language, the language of "madness". By forcing 
words to break with norms, poetry revolutionizes perceptions. Poetic 
praxis looks toward utopia. The explosion of the conventional 
historical forms negates present reality and projects the world toward 
the future. It is a transfiguration of the world. The vertiginous 
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destabilization of meaning revitalizes the process of signification and 
favours alterity over the homogenization of subjectivity — rather 
alarming in today's mcdonaldization of culture promoted by 
transnational capitalism. Opposed to standardized and reified language, 
this poetry becomes an aesthetic attempt to reinstate art in the life-
praxis and provide cognitive modalities which can open up new social 
and political spaces. Formal experimentation engenders new modes of 
being-in-the-world. 
The disorienting effects achieved by the poetic signifiers 
produce a definite and healthy distance from the habitual transparency 
of language. This sets in motion a process of unconscious displacement 
and condensation of signifiers that discloses the return of the repressed 
and liberates the subject from social and ideological constructs. The 
calculated "madness" of this poetic language represents a revolt against 
practices of social interdiction of discourses. By suspending the 
normality of dominant models of communication, this poetry enables 
the repressed and the marginalized to come to the surface — bodily and 
instinctual urges, otherness. Poetry opens up a human space not 
colonized by the hegemony of given social paradigms. The subject 
posits itself at an instinctual level, at a level of desire, that is at a level 
anterior to awareness and reflexive processes. Poetry allows desire to 
speak. In many ways it demonstrates Freud's penetrating maxim, 
"Where id was, there ego shall be" (Freud, 1964, p. 80). 
This poetry is rooted in the effort to produce subjectivity 
through language. It is a source of cognition and desire. But like Plato's 
eros, cognition is a desire that can never achieve totality. But then, 
wouldn't totality transform humans into gods? Or into monsters? 
York University 
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ABSTRACT : Poetry, Science, and the Epistemológica! Debate — 
The last few decades have witnessed a radical questioning of the 
cognitive possibilities traditionally associated both with science and 
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literature. This article gives a brief overview of the debate and provides a 
critique of the deconstructive and post-modern theories in their attempt to 
subvert fundamental epistemological claims. The article then addresses 
the specificity of poetic cognition and, distancing itself from mimetic 
conceptions of poetry, proposes ûiatpoiêsis entails a peculiar creation of 
reality, unattainable with other tools. It is the uniqueness of the 
materiality of poetic language that contributes to the formation of 
subjectivity and to the expansion of human reality and consciousness. 
RÉSUMÉ : La poésie, la science et le débat épistémologique — Au 
cours des dernières décennies, nous avons assisté à une remise en 
question radicale des possibilités cognitives qui étaient 
traditionnellement associées à la littérature et à la science. Le présent 
article se veut un bref survol de ce débat et une critique de la 
déconstruction et du post-modernisme dans leur tentative de remettre 
en question certaines des revendications épistémologiques 
fondamentales. Par la suite, l'article aborde la spécificité de la 
cognition poétique et, se distinguant des conceptions imitatrices de la 
poésie, propose que la poiêsis entraîne une création particulière de la 
réalité, inaccessible avec d'autres outils. C'est le caractère unique de la 
matérialité du langage poétique qui contribue à la formation de la 
subjectivité et au développement de la réalité humaine et de la 
conscience. 
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